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1. Epiphenomenalism
Epiphenomenalism claims that although 
mental events are caused by physical events, 
mental events do not causally affect the 
physical in turn (e.g., see Heil 1998, 37-38 
or Robinson 2003). This paper concerns the 
causal efficacy of qualia; it will not address 
issues concerning the causal efficacy of be-
liefs. So, for the remainder of this paper, 
‘epiphenomenalism’ refers to the view that 
qualia specifically do not affect the physical. 
‘Qualia’ is used in the usual sense; qualia are 
mental states “with a very distinctive sub-
jective character…There is something it is 
like for me to undergo each state;” qualia are 
“introspectively accessible, phenomenal as-
pects of our mental lives” (Tye 2013, intro-
duction). In this section, I argue that qualia 
are not epiphenomena.   
It is clear that certain types of bodily states 
are associated with or paired with certain 
types of qualia. For example, there is a close 
connection between tissue damage and pain 
qualia: where there is tissue damage, there 
is often pain. Different views in philoso-
phy of mind will offer different accounts 
of such regularities; e.g., the identity theory 
will claim that tissue damage causes brain 
states that the qualia are identical to in some 
sense, while dualism will claim that the bod-
ily states cause brain states which in turn 
cause the qualia. But for now, simply note 
such regularities, whatever the true explana-
tion of them might be. Likewise, there are 
close connections between certain types of 
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qualia and certain types of behavior. For example, there is a connection between pain and 
avoidance behavior: where there is pain, there is often avoidance behavior. It is this latter 
type of regularity, i.e., the connection between certain types of qualia and certain types of 
behavior, that is most relevant for our purposes. It is undeniable that such associations or 
pairings exist; and to be clear, when it is claimed that certain types of qualia are often “as-
sociated with” or “paired with” certain types of behavior, this simply means that the two 
generally appear together. Of course, these associations only hold most of the time, e.g., 
pain medication might keep pain qualia away in the face of tissue damage, but this sort of 
example will not affect the argument.  
Given that such associations exist, there is one aspect of them in particular that will play 
a role in the argument. To be specific, these associations do not appear random. Rather, at 
least in some cases, given the subjective nature of a given type of qualia, the behavior that 
is associated with the qualia seems “appropriate.” That is, given the intrinsic natures of 
some types of qualia, the behavior that is associated with the qualia is precisely what one 
would expect. There is often a high degree of “fit” or “appropriateness” to these associa-
tions. Qualia and behavior often seem to be “aligned” in the correct manner. To offer an 
example, again, pain qualia are generally associated with avoidance behavior. Pain qualia 
hurt, they are subjectively unpleasant. Given this, avoidance behavior is exactly the sort 
of behavior one would expect to be associated with pain qualia. To offer a different exam-
ple: consider someone who displays avoidance behavior when they have blue qualia. This 
strikes us as extremely bizarre precisely because avoidance behavior is not an appropriate 
behavior given blue qualia. There is nothing about the intrinsic nature of a blue quale that 
would suggest that it should be paired with (or correlated with) avoidance behavior. In 
short, the claim is the following: qualia have intrinsic natures. Some qualia, such as pain, 
are intrinsically unpleasant; they are unpleasant in and of themselves; they are unpleasant 
even in isolation from anything else (such as any beliefs we might have). Other qualia, 
such as pleasure, are intrinsically pleasant; they are pleasant in and of themselves; they are 
pleasant even in isolation from anything else. Moreover, given the intrinsic nature of these 
qualia, we would expect them to be paired with certain behaviors and not paired with other 
behaviors. We would (and do) expect pain to be correlated with avoidance behavior (and it 
is). We would (and do) expect pleasure to not be correlated with avoidance behavior (and 
it is not). We are surprised when these expectations are violated, as they are in, e.g., cases 
of masochism (which is discussed below).1               
I now formulate the argument. Of course, qualia either have causal powers or they do 
not; epiphenomenalism is either true or false. And again, there is a certain fit between the 
subjective natures of some types of qualia and the types of behavior that are associated 
with the qualia; given the nature of the qualia, the behavior seems appropriate. Suppose 
that qualia do not have causal powers, i.e., epiphenomenalism is true. But this is likely 
false for the following reason: if epiphenomenalism is true, then the “fit” between qualia 
and behavior is quite remarkable. Indeed, it would be nothing short of miraculous. For if 
1    One might think that qualia do not have “intrinsic natures” or “subjective natures.” But note that dualists generally do 
think that qualia have intrinsic and/or subjective natures, and epiphenomenalism is a prominent form of dualism; so dualistic 
epiphenomenalism, at least, cannot and will not deny these claims to avoid the argument. 
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qualia are epiphenomena, they play no role in the production of behavior; after all, they 
do not causally influence the physical. But then any type of qualia could, in principle, be 
associated with any type of behavior. For example, happiness might as well be associated 
with avoidance behavior: it wouldn’t make any difference. Therefore, given this, the fit 
between qualia and behavior is indeed quite surprising, so surprising, in fact, that it calls 
our assumption, i.e., epiphenomenalism, into question. So, epiphenomenalism is very im-
probable.2  Indeed, there is a far more plausible view: qualia and behavior show a high de-
gree of “fit” because qualia cause behavior. The reason that pain qualia are associated with 
avoidance behavior is that pain hurts, pain is unpleasant, and it causes us to recoil. This is 
the common sense view, but it is a view that is not taken seriously enough in contemporary 
philosophy of mind.3  So, we seem to be faced with the following choice: we can endorse 
the common sense view, or we can endorse a view that is highly improbable; it seems we 
should opt for the former. In effect, we should make an “inference to the best explanation” 
(see Harman 1965). 
To offer a slight reformulation of the argument: there are various types of qualia and there 
are various types of behavior. Assume that epiphenomenalism is true. If so, there is no 
causal connection between qualia and behavior; the subjective nature of a given qualia type 
does not shape behavior in any way. But then, in theory, any given type of qualia could 
be associated with – or paired with – any given type of behavior: qualia and behavior are 
independent of one another, at least in the causal sense. Further, there are very many possi-
ble pairings or associations when it comes to qualia and behavior. For example, avoidance 
behavior might have been associated with happiness, or blue, or pain, or any other type of 
qualia. Some of these pairings will exhibit a certain degree of appropriateness, e.g., those in 
which pain is associated with avoidance behavior, but a vast majority will not, e.g., those in 
which happiness, or blue, is associated with avoidance behavior. So, given epiphenomenal-
ism, it is highly improbable that we would find ourselves in a world in which qualia and 
behavior show a high degree of “fit” (again, there are far more inappropriate associations 
than appropriate ones). But we are in such a world, so it is very likely that epiphenomenal-
ism is false. 
2. Further Implications
The claims in section one suggest that two additional claims are true. First, the argument 
shows that, at least in some instances, different types of qualia have different causal pow-
ers. Again, the argument claims that there is a certain degree of fit between qualia and 
behavior, and this fit suggests that qualia cause behavior (for otherwise this fit would be an 
incredible coincidence). Further, suppose that different types of qualia all have the same 
2    This argument shares a premise with one offered by W. James (1879; 1890); both arguments appeal to the appropriate alignment 
between qualia and other factors such as behavior to call epiphenomenalism into question. There are significant differences 
between this argument and James’s argument as well, e.g., James made crucial appeal to natural selection in his argument (see 
Robinson (2003) for a brief discussion of James’s argument). (If the reader is unfamiliar with James’s argument, it was essentially 
the following: if qualia are epiphenomena, then we might as well enjoy harmful things and avoid things that aid our existence (but 
we do not). And if qualia are epiphenomena, natural selection cannot explain the appropriate alignments between beneficial things 
and what we enjoy, so we would have to take this alignment as a brute fact or a sort of pre-established harmony.)
3    To explain, many physicalists, at least, do not think that the subjective nature of a quale has causal powers. Indeed, some 
physicalists deny there are qualia (see, e.g., Dennett 2005). Likewise, epiphenomenalism is of course a prominent form of dualism 
(e.g., Kim (2005) claims that the subjective natures of qualia are non-physical and epiphenomenal).
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causal powers. So, e.g., happiness, or any other type of qualia, for that matter, could cause 
avoidance behavior. But if so, then we are once again faced with a highly improbable coin-
cidence. If any type of qualia can cause avoidance behavior, then it is surprising that pain, 
as opposed to some other type of qualia, is associated with avoidance behavior. In other 
words, it is surprising that there is a high degree of fit between qualia and the behavior that 
the qualia causes, if indeed another type of qualia could have caused the behavior just as 
well. In effect, if different types of qualia cannot have different causal powers, then the 
appropriate alignment between qualia and behavior becomes incredible once again. There-
fore, it must be that different types of qualia can have different causal powers.   
Second, and this is somewhat surprising, the key intuition on which the argument rests 
suggests that qualia have their causal powers necessarily, or in all metaphysically possible 
worlds. The reason this is surprising is that philosophers often think the laws of nature are 
metaphysically contingent. Indeed, if entities have their causal powers in all metaphysi-
cally possible worlds, it seems the commonplace distinction between nomological and 
metaphysical necessity collapses. Again, the key intuition on which the argument rests is 
that given the subjective natures of certain types of qualia, the behaviors that are associated 
with the qualia are appropriate; and this intuition suggests qualia cause behavior. In other 
words, the subjective nature of a quale determines its causal powers: the quale has the caus-
al powers that it has precisely because of its subjective nature. The essence of a quale, so to 
speak, determines its causal powers. But then, if the particular causal powers of qualia are 
fixed by the very nature of the qualia, anytime the qualia are present, the particular causal 
powers will be present as well. In effect, qualia will have their causal powers necessarily, 
or in all metaphysically possible worlds. To elaborate, the “fit intuition” suggests that there 
is a connection between the subjective nature or essence of a quale and its particular causal 
powers; the former determines the latter. But a quale will have the same subjective nature 
or essence in any metaphysically possible world in which it exists (this seems trivially 
true: if a quale has a different subjective nature from pain, say, if it feels pleasant, then it is 
necessarily not pain). But then, since the essence of a quale determines its causal powers, a 
quale will have the same causal powers in all metaphysically possible worlds.4  
3. Possible Objections
I now address possible objections. 
First, one might object that the argument proves little; after all, even if epiphenomenalism 
is highly improbable, it still might be true nevertheless. However, this objection should not 
be made lightly; it seems to underestimate just how highly improbable epiphenomenalism 
is if the argument succeeds. There are very many different kinds of qualia: think of how 
many different types of colors there are. And sounds. And emotions. Avoidance behavior 
will be an appropriate response to very few of these qualia types: pain, perhaps fear, per-
haps some sounds (e.g., annoying high pitched sounds) etc. That is to say, the odds that 
avoidance behavior would be associated with appropriate qualia types as a function of pure 
chance are rather low. And the same can be said for any other appropriate qualia-behavior 
4    Sprigge (1988) has also argued that pains and pleasures have their causal powers necessarily because their causal powers are 
determined by their nature; so the claim, while surprising, is certainly not new.
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pairing. And the odds that even a handful of appropriate pairings would obtain are very, 
very low (the odds of one improbable thing happening are small, but the odds that numer-
ous improbable things would happen are extremely small). In short, given epiphenomenal-
ism, the fact that some qualia are paired with appropriate behaviors, in the manner that they 
actually are, is so remarkable, so highly improbable, that one is tempted to simply conclude 
that epiphenomenalism is false. 
Second, one might object that the argument seems to work well for certain types of qualia 
but not for others. It seems there is a certain fit between, say, pain or happiness and the be-
havior they cause, but such a fit is less obvious with other types of qualia. That is, perhaps 
with some types of qualia, it is not obvious what the appropriate behavior would be. This 
objection seems reasonable, but the argument can succeed even if the point is conceded. 
All the argument requires is that a fit obtains between a handful of types of qualia and 
behaviors, because the probability of even a handful of appropriate alignments obtaining 
through pure chance is very low. It seems plausible that we can find enough cases in which 
an appropriate alignment obtains, even if there are cases that lack such an alignment. Ar-
guably, colors provide further examples of appropriate fits between qualia and behaviors. 
Think of the well-known research concerning “hot” and “cold” colors. For instance, blue 
qualia relax us; given the qualia, this is perhaps the behavior we would expect. It also 
seems that “emotional qualia” are often associated with appropriate behaviors as well; e.g., 
love and rage. So, it is not implausible that we can find enough appropriate alignments to 
allow the argument to succeed. 
Third, similarly, one might object: suppose there are cases in which there is an appropri-
ate alignment between qualia and behavior and cases in which there is not; again, maybe 
some qualia-behavior pairings have a high degree of fit, while others do not? If so, then 
maybe all the argument can show is that some types of qualia, i.e., those that play a role in 
an appropriate alignment, have causal powers. Perhaps, but this weaker result would still 
be significant. Also, there is something odd about this objection: why would some types of 
qualia have causal powers but others wouldn’t? That is, it seems plausible to infer that all 
qualia have causal powers if some do, to avoid positing a strange non-uniformity between 
various types of qualia. 
Fourth, one might object that given the appropriate alignments between qualia and be-
havior, it is inferred that qualia likely cause behavior. But on this view, it is still a mystery 
why these appropriate relations obtain. That is, even on this view, a given type of qualia 
might as well cause a different, inappropriate behavior. But this misses the point: qualia 
often cause the behaviors that they do precisely because of their subjective natures. In other 
words, the appropriate relationships between qualia and behavior are not astounding on 
this view, because the reason certain types of qualia cause the behaviors that they do is their 
subjective natures. It isn’t as if a given qualia type could just as easily cause a different, 
inappropriate behavior, because the very nature of the qualia determines what behavior the 
qualia cause. For example, pain is unpleasant, and this is precisely why it causes some of 
the behaviors that it does; there is no mystery here. 
Fifth, one might also object: posit a type of quale Q, a type of behavior B and a type of 
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brain state S. One might claim that both Q and B have a common cause, namely S. This 
explains why Q and B are always found together, and on this view, Q does not cause B (or 
perhaps anything else). That is, we have an explanation for the alignment, but qualia might 
be epiphenomena nevertheless.5  But this response fails. S causes two disparate things, Q 
and B. But it is still mysterious why Q and B are appropriate for one another. That is, if 
qualia are epiphenomena, then S might as well cause a different type of quale, Q’, that is 
inappropriate for B. In short, on this view, it is still astounding that qualia and behavior are 
often appropriately aligned; this view does not remove the problem, but merely shifts it 
around. A dualist might object: dualistic epiphenomenalism claims that the physical causes 
qualia. So, if S causes a type of qualia Q in the actual world, S will always cause Q in the 
actual world; and, for that matter, the same will hold in all worlds with the same laws of 
nature, i.e., the causal relation is nomologically necessary. So, it is not the case that “S 
might as well cause a different type of quale, Q’, that is inappropriate for B.” Quite simply, 
S cannot cause a different type of qualia, at least in our world. But the point is that if epi-
phenomenalism is true, it is surprising that the laws of nature in our world are what they 
are; i.e., it is surprising that S causes a type of qualia that is appropriate for B. A dualist 
might respond that the laws of nature are contingent, so there will be many worlds in which 
such fits obtain and many in which they do not, so it is not terribly surprising that we are in 
a world where they do obtain. But if the relevant causal laws are contingent, clearly there 
will be many more worlds in which these fits do not obtain than worlds in which they do; 
so it is still highly improbable that we would be in a world in which they obtain. To put the 
point a different way: we have two competing explanations for the appropriate alignments 
that obtain between qualia and behavior in our world. These alignments obtain either (i) 
because qualia cause behavior, and the subjective nature of qualia determine the specific 
behaviors that they cause, and so these relations are appropriate, and qualia have the same 
causal powers in all possible worlds, or they obtain (ii) because there are worlds in which 
these appropriate alignments happen to obtain (even though there are many more worlds 
in which they do not), and we happen to be in one of the worlds that has a certain degree 
of “alignment.” We have two competing explanations for some state of affairs (namely, the 
appropriate alignments), neither of which is obviously prima facie absurd; but (i) makes 
the probability that the state of affairs would obtain 1 (indeed, it makes the state of affairs 
necessarily true), while (ii) makes the state of affairs highly improbable. We should opt for 
(i). Ceteris paribus, if P is true, and there are two competing explanations for P, A and B, 
and A entails P while B makes it highly improbable that P, explanation A is better.6              
One might claim that perhaps the common cause of Q and B is appropriate for Q and B in 
some sense; this appropriateness explains why Q and B are appropriate for one another, and 
Q might be epiphenomenal all the same. But we must be told what this common cause is. 
Also, we must be shown that this common cause is “appropriate” for both Q and B. This 
might be difficult; it seems that in a vast majority of cause and effect relationships, there is 
5    Robinson (2003) raises precisely this objection to James’s argument alluded to above.
6    Someone might parody the argument: Joe has a yellow shirt on today. Either this is because (i) it is a necessary truth that Joe 
has a yellow shirt on today, or (ii) there are some worlds where Joe happens to have a yellow shirt on today (even though there 
are many more worlds in which he doesn’t), and this is one of them. We should endorse (i). But it’s bizarre, to say the least, to 
claim that Joe necessarily has a yellow shirt on. The problem with this objection is that (i), in this example, is clearly absurd; the 
probability that Joe necessarily has a yellow shirt on is likely zero. So the probability that (i) is true is very low. That is to say, 
the principle used above should not be used when one of the putative explanations for some state of affairs is obviously absurd.
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no “appropriateness” component (e.g., if we heat water, the water boils, but boiling doesn’t 
seem to be an “appropriate companion” to heat in the same way that some behaviors seem 
to be appropriate companions for some qualia). Another issue concerns the nature of the 
“appropriate” relation, specifically, is this relation transitive? If it is not, then the putative 
common cause might be appropriate for Q, and it might be appropriate for B, but Q and 
B might not be appropriate for one another, in which case this response to my argument 
fails. Granted, it seems like the “appropriate” relation would be transitive, but it seems like 
the “similarity relation” would be transitive as well, even though it doesn’t appear to be (it 
appears possible that some A might be similar to some B and B might be similar to some C 
even though A is not similar to C). Further, presumably this common cause will be a brain 
state, and it is difficult to see how a brain state can be an appropriate cause of a behavior in 
the same way that qualia appear to be.
Sixth, one might hold the following view: a type of qualia Q is correlated with (or is fre-
quently found with) a belief (or doxastic state) D. For instance, pain qualia are correlated 
with the belief that pain qualia are subjectively unpleasant; where one has pain qualia, one 
also often finds the belief that pain qualia are unpleasant. Furthermore, D might very well 
be the cause of B. This leaves open the possibility that Q causes nothing, i.e., qualia are 
epiphenomena. But now another puzzle arises: if qualia are epiphenomena, then it seems 
mysterious why they are correlated with the appropriate doxastic states. For example, pain 
qualia are intrinsically unpleasant; they are unpleasant in and of themselves. But if pain 
qualia do nothing in a causal sense, then they might as well be correlated with differ-
ent doxastic states; for example, pain qualia might as well be associated with the belief 
that pain qualia are pleasant. So, just as it was mysterious why certain types of qualia 
are associated with appropriate behaviors if qualia are epiphenomena, this view makes it 
mysterious why certain types of qualia are associated with appropriate beliefs if qualia are 
epiphenomena. One could modify the argument (in section one) to conclude that qualia 
cause certain beliefs (as opposed to behaviors), and call epiphenomenalism into question 
all the same.      
Seventh, above, I claimed that emotional qualia are sometimes associated with appropri-
ate behaviors. One might claim that the explanation for this is that the behavior itself is a 
constituent part of the emotion (see Goldie (2000), for example, who claims that emotions 
involve dispositions to behave in certain ways). The problem with this objection is that 
we still need an explanation for why certain behaviors are associated with the appropriate 
qualia. If the subjective natures of qualia play no role in determining behavior, then again, 
any behavior could have been associated with any type of qualia. 
Eighth, I argued that qualia are often associated with appropriate behaviors, and this sug-
gests that qualia cause the behaviors; for example, pain qualia cause avoidance behavior. 
But there are rare examples in which an agent appears to have pain qualia but does not 
display avoidance behavior or any other behavior typically found with pain (say, wincing). 
Indeed, the agents claim to feel pain, even intense pain, yet do not seem to be bothered by 
it. This condition has been thought to arise from prefrontal lobotomies, hypnosis, nitrous 
oxide, or certain drugs such as morphine (see Aydede (2013, section 5.1) for an interesting 
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discussion of this issue).7  But if pain qualia can be present in the absence of the behaviors 
generally associated with pain, qualia do not cause these behaviors, and my argument fails. 
It seems plausible, however, that the pain qualia in question still have their normal causal 
powers, e.g., they still have the causal power to cause avoidance behavior or wincing; it is 
simply that the qualia are prevented from exercising these causal powers. So, for instance, 
nitrous oxide or morphine interferes with the brain in such a manner that prevents pain 
qualia from causing avoidance behavior or wincing, even though they still have, and al-
ways will have, the causal power to do so. There is nothing strange about an entity being 
prevented from exercising its causal powers. For example, a massive amount of water has 
the causal power to destroy a town, but perhaps it is prevented from exercising this causal 
power by a dam. We wouldn’t claim, for instance, that the water lacks the causal power in 
question simply because it is prevented from exercising it.8  
Ninth, one might object that the appropriate relation between pain and avoidance behavior 
does not hold in cases of masochism. Here are instances in which an agent has pain qualia 
that are not accompanied by avoidance behavior; if so, pain qualia do not cause avoidance 
behavior. But again, a plausible response is to claim that the pain qualia in question have 
the causal power to cause avoidance behavior and wincing, but the qualia are prevented 
from exercising these causal powers for some reason. In fact, even masochists no doubt 
react in normal ways to pain in some or even many cases (e.g., if someone sneaks up be-
hind them and hits their foot with a hammer), and have limits as to how much pain they 
can withstand before they display the normal reactions to it; this suggests that a masochist’s 
pain has the usual causal powers, but these causal powers are simply nullified or overridden 
sometimes. Perhaps the brain of a masochist simply has a different physical organization 
than the brain of a non-masochist, and this difference in organization prevents pain qualia 
from exercising their causal powers at times? Also note that we seem to view masochism 
as almost a quasi-logical anomaly. It strikes us as very odd that pain qualia can lack some 
of the causal powers they are thought to have; perhaps a more plausible explanation is that 
pain qualia never lack these causal powers, but are simply prevented from exercising them 
in some instances. 
Tenth, the epiphenomenalist might attack the claim that qualia have at least some causal 
powers necessarily by arguing, for example, that it is conceivable that qualia have differ-
ent causal powers, so it is possible that qualia have different causal powers. For instance, 
we can imagine a world where pain does not cause avoidance behavior, but causes people 
to, say, lift their right arm; so, there is a world in which this is the case. Further, if the 
fit intuition entails that qualia have some causal powers necessarily, it must be false, so 
the argument cannot even show that qualia have causal powers in the actual world. It 
is conceded that we can conceive of such worlds; this seems undeniable. Indeed, such 
scenarios are probably even easier to imagine than zombies. However, following many 
7    Philosophers might be familiar with such issues through Dennett’s (1978) classic paper “Why You Can’t Make a Computer 
that Feels Pain.”
8    One might wonder what more banal examples of pain imply for the argument; e.g., think of a case in which someone has a 
headache but takes aspirin. Such cases do not affect the argument: the aspirin will cause the pain qualia to go away, but for my 
argument to be falsified, we need cases in which pain qualia are present but the typical behaviors are not.
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others, it is denied that conceivability is an accurate guide to possibility.9  Many have 
claimed, for example, that we can conceive of worlds in which water is not H20; yet if 
Kripke (1972) is correct, such worlds are impossible. Here is a slightly different argu-
ment: some can imagine that there are worlds in which pain, for example, causes entirely 
different sorts of behavior than it causes in the actual world. But some can also imagine 
that such worlds do not exist, i.e., it is conceivable to some that pain has its causal pow-
ers necessarily; the idea is not incoherent or logically inconsistent, for example. After all, 
the claim was endorsed above. But then, if conceivability entails possibility, worlds in 
which pain has different causal powers than it has in the actual world are both possi-
ble and impossible, a contradiction. Therefore, conceivability does not entail possibility.10 
Eleventh, one might claim that although we do judge that there is a fit between qualia and 
behavior, this judgment is false (judgments that are about qualia, such as the one we are 
discussing here, are generally called “phenomenal judgments” in the literature). Perhaps 
we are simply hardwired in such a manner that we form this (incorrect) phenomenal judg-
ment? However, this objection is problematic. It is strange that we would be predisposed to 
form an incorrect phenomenal judgment. What purpose does this judgment serve? Why is 
it there? Why, e.g., would we evolve to have a predisposition to form an incorrect phenom-
enal judgment? Why should we think the judgment is false (aren’t many, if not most, of our 
phenomenal judgments accurate)? The objection has no force unless we are given a reason 
to reject the judgment. Perhaps we judge that there is a fit between behavior and qualia 
simply because some types of qualia are generally associated with certain behaviors, and 
we think there must be some reason for this association? But then why does it seem that 
the fit is stronger in some cases than in others? And it is clear that we see cases of constant 
conjunction all of the time, yet don’t judge that the relation between the relevant entities is 
appropriate. We might judge that there is a causal relation at work, but not necessarily an 
appropriate relation. So why would we do so in the case of qualia and behavior? 
Twelfth, one might object that a necessary truth is inferred from a probabilistic argument, 
and it is difficult to see how an argument from probability can establish a necessary truth. 
But this objection misconstrues the structure of the overall argument. The fit intuition, 
when combined with certain other claims (e.g., the observation that the fit is not a result of 
pure chance), entails that epiphenomenalism is very improbable. Moreover, the fit intui-
tion entails that these causal powers are metaphysically necessary. A necessary truth is not 
inferred from the probabilistic argument per se; rather, it is the fit intuition that suggests 
that these causal powers are metaphysically necessary. Basically, the fit intuition suggests 
both that qualia have causal powers in the first place, and it also suggests that these causal 
powers are metaphysically necessary.  
9    See, for example, Hill and McLaughlin 1999, 446; Hill 1997; Loar 1999; and Block and Stalnaker 1999; of course, often this 
literature is an attempt to undermine Chalmers’s (1996) zombie argument. See also Kirk (2012, section 5.1) for a discussion of 
this issue.
10    See also Winstanley (2007); Winstanley argues that, at least on Chalmers’s account of conceivability and possibility, the claim 
that conceivability entails possibility implies a contradiction (because we can conceive that a necessary being exists and we can 
conceive that such a being does not exist). Winstanley (2007) argues that this problem even applies to Chalmers’s more recent, and 
more sophisticated, account of the relationship between conceivability and possibility (see, e.g., Chalmers 2002). Another issue is 
this: presumably, our ability to conceive of certain situations is a cognitive ability that is, for example, carried out by some part of 
the brain. It is difficult to see why we should think this ability is perfect, or this area of the brain is infallible etc.  
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In sum, there are numerous possible objections to the argument: some deny that there are 
appropriate relations between qualia and behavior at all; some point out that appropriate 
relations obtain only sometimes; some grant that the appropriate relations obtain but try to 
find some other explanation for them than the one I offer; still other objections try different 
strategies. However, there are responses to these objections. 
4. Dualism
Thus far, I’ve argued that (i) qualia have causal powers, i.e., epiphenomenalism is false, (ii) 
different types of qualia have different causal powers, and (iii) qualia have at least some of 
their causal powers necessarily. These claims, if true, have some implications for dualism, 
which I now discuss. 
First, of course, dualistic epiphenomenalism is a prominent form of dualism; indeed, it 
has been perhaps the most common form of dualism throughout dualism’s history. But if 
epiphenomenalism is likely false, dualistic epiphenomenalism is likely false. It seems the 
only viable form of dualism is interactionism; note that the argument in section one also 
shows that parallelism is likely false; in fact, the argument applies to any view that denies 
that the subjective natures of qualia have causal powers. Second, any worry that dualism 
might be committed to epiphenomenalism, e.g., the concern over the causal closure of the 
physical, or more traditionally, the concern over the conservation of energy, becomes even 
more pressing; if epiphenomenalism is probably false, then dualists cannot simply endorse 
epiphenomenalism to avoid such worries. 
The dualist might object: it seems that your argument causes serious problems for certain 
forms of physicalism too, e.g., any form of physicalism that denies that the subjective na-
tures of qualia have causal powers. And, just as it makes, say, worries over causal closure 
more pressing, doesn’t it also make worries over Kim’s (2000; 2005) exclusion argument 
more pressing? I grant this objection: any view that denies that the subjective natures of 
qualia have causal powers, whether the view is a form of dualism or a form of physicalism, 
is likely false. To elaborate, a dualist might object that the argument calls functionalism, the 
view endorsed by many contemporary physicalists, into question. Functionalism, at least in 
its most commonplace, basic form, claims that what determines the nature of, say pain, are 
the inputs that lead to pain (say, someone stepping on your foot) and the outputs that pain 
produces (including certain behaviors). But if the nature of pain is determined by what it 
causes, at least in part, and not vice versa, then it seems that any type of qualia could have 
been associated with pain (e.g., pain might as well feel like happiness, it wouldn’t make 
any difference since the way that pain feels plays no role in determining what it causes). 
I do not know if this objection against functionalism succeeds or not, but assuming that it 
does, it is granted as well. If functionalism must deny that the subjective nature of qualia 
does not help determine what behaviors the qualia cause, then it is probably false.      
Finally, there is, of course, much debate concerning the modal strength of the laws of na-
ture: some hold they are metaphysically necessary (e.g., Wilson 2005; Shoemaker 1980, 
1998; Swoyer 1982; Bird 2005) while many others hold they are metaphysically contin-
gent (or are only nomologically necessary). A commonplace assumption in this debate is 
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that all causal laws are metaphysically necessary or all causal laws are metaphysically 
contingent; it is not the case that some laws are contingent while others are necessary. I do 
not know if this assumption is true or not. However, there are some reasons for thinking 
that it is true. One reason is that generally when an argument seeks to show that laws are 
metaphysically necessary or contingent, the argument is such that it applies to all instances 
of causation. So, e.g., one might think the laws of nature are metaphysically contingent 
because one endorses Hume’s dictum, the claim that there cannot be necessary connections 
between distinct entities; but if Hume’s dictum is true, all causal laws are metaphysically 
contingent. Therefore, if some causal laws are contingent while others are necessary, prac-
tically everyone that has participated in the debate, and practically all of the arguments that 
have been formulated for either side, are mistaken. Also, perhaps the modal strength of a 
relation is such an important – central – aspect of the relation that it is an essential aspect 
of the relation? Moreover, one could argue that the burden of proof is on those who argue 
that causal relations can have different modal strengths; if one is going to posit a novel 
metaphysical asymmetry, plausibly, they must justify it. At any rate, if this assumption is 
true, i.e., if it is the case that all causal laws have the same modal strength, then given that 
at least some of the causal laws that involve qualia are metaphysically necessary (section 
two), then all causal laws are metaphysically necessary. 
And given that interactionism claims that the physical causes qualia, the same brain state 
types will cause the same qualia types in all metaphysically possible worlds; but then 
qualia will strongly supervene on the physical. But note that some dualists have some-
times associated dualism with the claim that qualia only nomologically supervene on the 
physical (whereas physicalism is associated with the claim that qualia strongly supervene 
on the physical); Chalmers (1996) is a notable example. But if qualia strongly supervene 
on the physical, then the dualist will be unable to characterize dualism as the view that 
qualia only nomologically supervene. Indeed, we might need a new way to characterize 
dualism and physicalism alike if metaphysical and nomological supervenience collapse 
into one another. Moreover, some of the best arguments for dualism argue that qualia only 
nomologically supervene on the physical. But if qualia strongly supervene on the physi-
cal, then by definition, physical duplicates cannot have inverted qualia and phenomenal 
zombies will be impossible. In other words, dualism will be unable to appeal to much of its 
current justification (see Byrne (2010) for more on inverted qualia arguments for dualism 
and Chalmers (1996) for the zombie argument). Of course, dualism still might be true. It is 
simply that now we have less reason to believe it.11  
 
11    I would like to thank anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions.
Jason Megill | An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism
15
REFERENCES
Aydede, M. 2013. Pain. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition). 
Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed February 17, 2014. http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2013/entries/pain/. 
Bird, A. 2005. The Dispositionalist Conception of Laws. Foundations of Science 10: 
353-370.
Block, N. and R. Stalnaker. 1999. Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory 
Gap. Philosophical Review 108: 1-46.
Byrne, A. 2010. Inverted Qualia. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 
Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed February 17, 2014. http://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/qualia-inverted/. 
Chalmers, D. J. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New 
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chalmers, D. J. 2002. Does conceivability entail possibility? In Conceivability and 
Possibility, ed. T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, 145-200. Clarendon Press: 
Oxford.
Dennett, D. C. 1978. Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain. In Brainstorms, 
190-229. Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press. 
Dennett, D. C. 2005. Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Conscious-
ness. Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press. 
Goldie, P. 2000. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Harman, G. 1965. The Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Review 74: 88-
95. 
Heil, J. 1998. Philosophy of Mind: a contemporary introduction. London and New York: 
Routledge.
Hill, C. S. 1997. Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem. 
Philosophical Studies 87: 61-85. 
Hill, C. S. and B.P. McLaughlin. 1999. There are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are 
Dreamt of in Chalmers’s Philosophy. Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 59: 446-454. 
James, W. 1879. Are We Automata? Mind 4:1-22. 
James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. H. Holt. 
Kim, J. 2000. Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Men-
tal Causation. Cambridge, MASS: MIT Press/Bradford Books.
Kim, J. 2005. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press. 
Kirk, R. 2006. Zombies. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2012 Edi-
tion). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed February 17, 2014. http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/ zombies/.
Kripke, S. 1972. Naming and Necessity. In Semantics of Natural Language, ed. D. Dav-
idson and G. Harman, 253-355. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel. 
Loar, B. 1999. David Chalmers’s The Conscious Mind. Philosophy and Phenomenologi-
cal Research 59: 465-472.
Robinson, W. 2003. Epiphenomenalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
EuJAP | Vol. 9 | No. 2 | 2013
16
(Spring 2003 Edition). Edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed March 7th, 2006.   
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/ entries/epiphenomenalism/.
Shoemaker, S. 1980. Causality and Properties. In Time and Cause, ed. P. van Inwagen. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company. 
Shoemaker, S. 1998. Causal and Metaphysical Necessity. Pacific Philosophical Quar-
terly 79: 59-77. 
Sprigge, T. L. S. 1988. The Rational Foundations of Ethics. London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul.
Swoyer, C. 1982. The Nature of Natural Laws. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60: 
203-223.
Tye, M. 2013. Qualia. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2008 Edi-
tion). Edited by Edward. N. Zalta. Accessed February 17, 2014. http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fal2013/entries/qualia/.
Wilson, J. 2005. Supervenience-based Formulations of Physicalism. Nous XXXIX, 3: 
426-459.
Winstanley, P. 2007. Conceivability, Possibility, and Two Dimensional Semantics. Per-
cipi 1: 18-31.
________________________________________________________________________
Received: March 24, 2012 
Accepted: January 3, 2013
Carroll College
1803 Poplar Street
Helena MT, 59601 USA
jlm3am@virginia.edu
Jason Megill | An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism
17
